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Abstract
We test in the laboratory how entrepreneurs’ skill perceptions influence the design
of financing and advising contracts. Our theoretical framework proposes that self-
confident entrepreneurs prefer issuing debt whereas low self-confident ones prefer
equity which induces strong investor assistance. The prevalence of overconfidence
makes investors more reluctant to accept debt oﬀers and constrains self-confident
entrepreneurs to finance through mixed securities. Experimental results show that
self-confident entrepreneurs issue more debt-like securities and receive less assis-
tance. We also show that entrepreneurs learn not to oﬀer pure debt and that initial
ignorance of their own skills reinforces entrepreneurs’ ability to learn through risky
choices.
JEL: C72, C92, D83.
Keywords : Entrepreneurs, investment decision, learning, overconfidence, ven-
ture capital.
1 Introduction
In the face of high failure rates of new ventures and the low return of entrepreneurial
activity (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), it is often argued that entrepreneurs
exhibit too much confidence in their own abilities, in future outcomes and in their
judgments (Busenitz 1999, Cooper et al. 1988, Palich and Bagby 1995). Whereas
entrepreneurial overconfidence is viewed as the main reason of excess entry (Camerer
and Lovallo 1999), little is known on the precise eﬀect of overconfidence on some
other key entrepreneurial decisions, such as the choice of start-up financing. The
question is all the more important that the economics and finance literature suggests
that financing choices significantly aﬀect new ventures’ performance. Accordingly,
a common view is that venture capitalists provide valuable managerial inputs and
increase the ex post performance of their portfolio firms (Kaplan and Strömberg
2004). Reconciling entrepreneurial overconfidence and the recurse to venture capi-
tal is however far from being obvious. For example, founders who overestimate their
personal abilities may neglect resource needs of their venture and reject valuable so-
cial ties and/or external advice critical to success (Hayward et al. 2006). Following
this idea, it is questionable whether overconfident entrepreneurs would be interested
by the advising activity of venture capitalists.
The main objective of the paper is to test experimentally whether and how en-
trepreneurial self-confidence (possibly overconfidence) aﬀects the choice of financing
and advising contracts. Our game, inspired from the theoretical model of Vilanova
(2013), considers the interaction between individuals that possess an investment
project (henceforth, entrepreneurs) and investors. The probability of project suc-
cess depends on the entrepreneur’s skills, which depends within game on the en-
trepreneur’s rank on a general quiz like in Camerer and Lovallo (1999). After the
quiz, and without feedback on his quiz performance, each entrepreneur proposes a
contract to the investor that specifies the repartition of outcomes in case of success
and in case of failure. If the investor accepts the oﬀer, the contract is signed and
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the investor sets the intensity of his advising activity (which is non contractible).
This advising activity increases the project’s probability of success in the sole case
when the entrepreneur’s performance to the quiz is low, i.e. when the entrepreneur
is poorly skilled.
This simple framework permits to capture an entrepreneur’s basic choice of fi-
nancing, i.e., bank financing vs. venture capital financing (de Bettignies and Brander
2007, Winton and Yerramilli 2008). Banks’ claims are poorly sensitive to the ven-
ture’s performance and banks are often presented as passive investors that bring
little advice to the firm. In contrast, venture capitalists are active investors that
bring advising services to their portfolio firms. They also receive more “equity-like”
securities that give them higher upside in case of sucess. According to Vilanova
(2013), the trade-oﬀ between these two forms of financing should depend on the
entrepreneur’s skill perceptions. A high self-confident entrepreneur should naturally
prefer to issue debt because (i) debt financing gives him a higher payoﬀ in case
of success, a state of nature that he considers as highly probable (ii) he believes
that his own talent is suﬃcient to succeed and is, hence, reluctant to pay for a
venture capitalist’s advising activity. In contrast a low self-confident entrepreneur
should prefer to issue an equity-like security that gives the investor more incentives
to exert an advising eﬀort. This suggests the existence of a natural separating equi-
librium where high self-confident entrepreneurs issue debt securities and where low
self-confident ones issue equity securities. The prevalence of entrepreneurial over-
confidence - i.e. the fact that some high self-confident entrepreneurs overestimate
their skills - could however aﬀect the equilibrium contracting choices. Basically, if
investors suspect entrepreneurial overconfidence, high self-confident entrepreneurs
could be denied debt financing and could be obliged to issue securities that have
more equity-features than their preferred choice. At the extreme, i.e. when overcon-
fidence is highly pervasive, all the entrepreneurs (high- and low self-confident ones)
could issue the same security and a pooling equilibrium might dominate.
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To our knowledge, our paper is the first to experimentally test how entrepreneurial
(over)confidence aﬀects equilibrium financing and advising contracts. Existing em-
pirical studies (either in the laboratory or in the field) have focused on the behavioral
consequences of overconfidence without considering the interactions with providers
of resources. Along this line of inquiry, extent research has demonstrated that over-
confident individuals are more likely to select risky projects and to overinvest (e.g.
Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Malmendier and Tate 2008). Also highly-confident in-
dividuals tend to discount advice (Tost et al. 2012) and are less likely to seek for
advice (See et al. 2011). Another stream of research has examined experimentally
optimal contracting either in an adverse-selection context (Cabrales and Charness
2005) or in a principal-agent context (Anderhub et al. 2002). To our knowledge,
however, there exists no empirical evidence on optimal contracting with potentially
overconfident agents.
Our experiment also adresses the dynamics of contracting. Over time, en-
trepreneurs can revise their initial self-views, learn their true skills and adapt their
contractual oﬀers. During the first periods, entrepreneurs should set their oﬀers ac-
cording to their perceived skills and, because these perceptions might be upwardly
biased, investors should apply an “overconfidence premium”. In the final periods,
entrepreneurs should be more informed about their true type and contractual oﬀers
should reflect their actual skills rather that their initial perceived skills. If learning
takes place, final periods should give rise to a separating equilibrium where high-
skilled entrepreneurs and low-skilled entrepreneurs opt for debt securities and equity
securities respectively. In our game, however, the convergence towards this separat-
ing equilibrium is not guaranteed. First, convergence could be hampered by the fact
that entrepreneurs insuﬃciently adjust their beliefs to new information and/or by
the fact that investors are doubtful about the entrepreneurs’ capacity to learn their
true skills. Second, consistent with the learning dynamics observed in the ultima-
tum game (Cooper et al. 1988, Slonim and Roth 1998), high-skilled entrepreneurs
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could learn not to oﬀer securities that give investors a small fraction of outcomes,
that is, pure debt securities. Hence, how optimal contracting evolves over time and
experience is an open question that deserves further investigation.
The rest of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the theoretical back-
ground. Section 3 adresses the experimental design. Section 4 presents the findings
and we conclude in Section 5.
2 Theoretical background
We experimentally test a simplified version of the model proposed by Vilanova
(2013).1
The model considers two players: F (the financier) and E (the entrepreneur).
E needs 80 to finance a project but has no initial wealth. In order to finance his
project, E must obtain funds from F. We denote by r, the rate of return required
by F in order to finance E.
Project success depends on two parameters: E’s managerial skills and the advis-
ing (or supporting) eﬀort provided by F. E might possess high skills (type H) or low
skills (type L). It is common knowledge that there is an equal proportion of type-H
and of type-L in the economy. When F finances E but provides no advice (M = 0),
the project managed by a type-H entrepreneur generates a final outcome 200 with
probability 1 whereas the project managed by a type-L yields a final payoﬀ 50 with
probability 1. The intensity of F’s advising activity (M) can however increase the
chance of success of a venture managed by a type-L entrepreneur. We capture this
value-adding eﬀect of advising by considering that a project managed by a type-L
entrepreneur is successful (yields 200) with probability M and fails (yields 50) with
probability (1 M). Obviously, advising is costly and we denote by cM the cost of
1Vilanova (2013) proposes a double moral hazard model where the entrepreneur and the investor
both exert eﬀort after contracting and where both eﬀorts aﬀect the venture’s final payoﬀ. In this
article, and in order to simplify the game for participants, we consider instead that only the
investor’s (advising) eﬀort aﬀects the venture’s chance of sucess.
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advising eﬀort for F. We assume that this cost is an increasing and convex function
in M .
The order of moves is the following:
1. Player E oﬀers a contract Ci to player F . This contract specifies the allocation
of cash flow rights depending on the project’s final return. The contract proposes
to pay Gi%200 to player F in case of success and Pi%50 to player F in case of
failure. We restrict here the set of feasible contracts to four contracts (see Figure 1).
These contracts can be distinguished on two dimensions: the equity component of
the security oﬀered to player F (or equivalently, the incentive package proposed to
the financier) measured by Gi%200   Pi%50; the downside protection provided to
the financier measured by Pi%50. We interpret payment schemes where financiers
receive a low incentive package and a high downside protection as debt-like contracts.
In contrast, contracts with a high incentive package and a low downside protection
are interpretated as equity-like contracts. This leads us to interpret C1 as an equity
contract, C2 as a debt contract, C3 as a mixed security with a debt-like orientation
and C4 as a mixed security with an equity-like orientation.
Insert Figure 1 about here
2. Player F accepts the oﬀer or not. This decision depends on the oﬀered
contract, on player F’s perceptions about player E’s skills (pFH) and on player F’s
required return (r).
3. If the oﬀer is accepted, the project is implemented and F decides on the
intensity of his advising activity (M). The advising eﬀort of player F is not con-
tractible. We use a mini-game” where we restrict the intensity of advising eﬀort to
four values, M 2 (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75). Table 1 summarizes the four values of M and
their associated costs cM . Notably, cM is an increasing and convex function in M .2
2The values of cM in Table 2 were computed by assuming that cM = kM2/2 with k = 160 when
M = 0.25 and k = 150 for M = 0.5 and M = 0.75.
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Insert Table 1 about here
Obviously, the choices made by E and F depend on their respective beliefs about
the actual skills of the entrepreneur. We denote by pEH 2 [0, 1], E’s subjective belief
that he is H. The higher is pEH , the more E is self-confident. Symetrically, F will
decide to accept the security oﬀered by E and will choose the intensity of his advising
activity according to pFH 2 [0, 1], which denotes F’s belief that E is of type H.
In this setting, the contract Ci oﬀered by E should be the solution to the following
maximization problem:
Max
Gi%,Pi%
pEH(1 Gi%)200 +
 
1  pEH
 
[M(1 Gi%)200 + (1 M) (1  Pi%)50] (1)
M 2 argmax pFHGi%200 + (1  pFH) [MGi%200 + (1 M)Pi%50]  cM (2)
pFHGi%200 + (1  pFH) [MGi%200 + (1 M)Pi%50]  cM   (1 + r)80   0 (3)
where (1) represents E’s expected payoﬀ, (2) is for F ’s IC constraint and (3) is
for F ’s participation constraint.
As obvious here, there exist multiple solutions depending on the precise value
of pEH , pFH and r. A crucial point is that pFH is partly contingent on the contract
oﬀer made by E. When setting his beliefs on E’s skills, F accounts for the facts that
(i) E’s oﬀer might convey information about E’s self-confidence (i.e. pEH) and, (ii)
even if E’s oﬀer perfectly reveals pEH , F might estimate that E’s oﬀer is an imperfect
signal of E’s true quality and might set pFH < pEH if he suspects entrepreneurial
overconfidence.
2.1 Results of the static game
In the static model presented above, where learning eﬀects are absent, the main
propositions are the following:
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Proposition 1 (F’s advising eﬀort): F advising eﬀort (M) increases in the
equity component of the oﬀered contract, i.e. (Gi%200   Pi%50), and decreases in
F’s perceptions of E’s skills, i.e. pFH .
This is direct by computing the FOC of (2). The optimal advising eﬀort of the
player F is such that c0M = (1  pFH)(Gi%200  Pi%50).
Proposition 2 (E’s preferences): Highly-confident Es, i.e., those with high
pEH , prefer to issue a security with a strong debt component (C2 optimally or C3 ).
In contrast, self-unconfident Es (i.e., those with low pEH) prefer to issue a security
with a strong equity component (C1 optimally or C4 ).
The intuition is straightforward. From (1), it is direct that an extremely self-
confident E (with pEH = 1) believes that F’s advising is useless. He is also prone
to abandon all the project’s cash flows in case of failure (i.e. to oﬀer a contract
with Pi% = 1). Then, he prefers to issue a security with a strong debt component
that limits the intensity of investor advising eﬀort. In contrast a low self-confident
entrepreneur (i.e. a player E with low pEH) prefers intensive advising (high M).
Because F’s advising eﬀort cannot entirely compensate low entrepreneurial skills
(i.e. M < 1), he is also less prone to sacrify his payoﬀ in case of failure than a high
self-confident entrepreneur and prefers to set Pi% < 1. All in all, a low self-confident
entrepreneur prefers to issue a security with a strong equity component.
Proposition 3 (Separating equilibrium when players E have accurate
beliefs about their skills): When players Es beliefs are unbiased (presumably in
final periods), that is when entrepreneurs accurately estimate their skill level:
- High self-confident/ High-skilled Es should oﬀer a debt contract (C2), player F
should accept the oﬀer and should set M = 0.
- Low self-confident/ Low-skilled Es should issue equity (C1), player F should accept
and should set M = 0.75.
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If entrepreneurs have accurate self-beliefs, a separating equilibrium should arise.
Consider the case of a player E of type H. If accurate, this player should have
beliefs pEH = 1 and should oﬀer a security with P% = 1 . Observing this oﬀer,
F should induce that E is of type H (pFH = pEH = 1) and should set his advising
eﬀort to M = 0. Then, the optimal contract is such that Gi%200 = (1 + r) 80 and
Pi%50 = 50, which resembles to contract C2 in our “mini-game”. Consider now the
reverse case when the entrepreneur has low self-confidence and when both players
share the same beliefs, i.e. pFH = pEH = 0. In this case, both players agree on the
necessity of a high advising eﬀort. The low self-confident E has no incentive to
mimick a high self-confident E by issuing C2 because this would destroy player F’s
incentive to exert eﬀort. He is then better oﬀ by issuing a security with a strong
equity-component, which corresponds in our setting to C1. When observing C1, the
financier should revise his beliefs to pFH = 0 and should set his advising eﬀort to
M = 0.75.3
Proposition 4 (Optimal contracting when players E have available in-
formation but are suspected of being overconfident): When players E have
available information about their skills but financiers suspect the presence of over-
confident Es, players F should reject debt oﬀers C2. High self-confident Es should
rather issue mixed securities (C3 or C4), financiers should accept and should exert
an intermediate eﬀort (M = 0.25 or 0.5).
In our model, a suspicion of unrealistic optimism exists when pFH < pEH . Obviously
this suspicion aﬀects the choice of financing and advising contracts. Consider for
instance the case of a high self-confident entrepreneur, pEH = 1. By prediction 3, we
know that when entrepreneurs’ beliefs are unbiased a high self-confident/high-skilled
E prefers issuing a debt contract with G% = (1+r)IXg and P% = 1 that induces no
advising eﬀort (M = 0). This debt financing contract is accessible if the financier’s
3If E oﬀers C1 and pFH = 0, c0M is equal to 150,the highest possible value in our mini-game.
Because cM is an increasing and convex function in M , F will exert the highest possible eﬀort, i.e.
M = 0.75.
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beliefs are similar to the ones of the entrepreneur ( pFH = pEH = 1). In contrast,
if player F suspects the presence of overconfident Es, i.e. if pFH < pEH ⌘ 1, a high
self-confident E has no other choice but to issue a security which provides a higher
upside to the financier (with G%Xg > (1 + r) I) and that induces a strictly positive
advising eﬀort (M > 0). This contract that combines debt and equity components
resembles more to a mixed security (C3 or C4) than to pure debt.4
Proposition 5 (Pooling equilibrium when players have no information
on Es’ skills): When players have no available information on entrepreneurial
skills ( pFH = pEH = 0.5), players E should issue a mixed security (either C3 or C4),
players F should accept and should set an intermediate advising eﬀort (M = 0.25
or 0.5).
In certain contexts, Es could have poor information about their skills. Within
our game, this corresponds to a case where entrepreneurs have no private informa-
tion about their entrepreneurial skills and set pEH = 0.5, which corresponds to the
proportion of type-H in the economy. In our model, this configuration precludes any
(pooling) equilibrium with C2 (because player’s F participation constraint would not
hold) or with C1 (because player E is better oﬀ with a mixed security that oﬀers a
lower equity component to player F).
2.2 Learning and dynamic contracting
A crucial point is that our theoretical framework does not adress how players’ E
beliefs evolve over time. When learning opportunities exist, that is, when players
E can learn their true type through experience, the behavior of both players might
diﬀer from the ones described above. How contract oﬀers and advising eﬀorts evolve
4Formally speaking, whether Es with diﬀerent self-confidence (those with high pEH vs those
with low pEH) separate or pool depends on the fraction of overconfident Es. If overconfidence is
moderate, Es with high pEH can still signal their high self-confidence by issuing a security with
more debt features than the one issued by Es with low pEH). If, instead, overconfidence is high, all
players E (those with high pEH and those with low pEH) should issue the same mixed security (see
Vilanova 2013). Also, in the latter case where a pooling equilibrium arises, the optimal contract
(either C3 or C4) also depends on r , i.e. player’s F required return.
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over time is however an open question.
If learning occurs, the base-line prediction is that players should converge towards
the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 3. During the first periods,
Es should set their oﬀers according to their perceived skills and, because these
perceptions might be upwardly biased, Fs should apply an overconfidence “premium”.
In particular, this suspicion of optimism could lead to systematic rejections of pure
debt contracts (C2) in early rounds. In the final periods, players E should have
updated their self-beliefs and should be more informed about their true type. Hence,
contractual oﬀers in late rounds should reflect their actual skills rather than their
perceived skills and the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 3 should
prevail.
Proposition 6 (Rational learning): Over time, players should converge to-
wards the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 3 in which high-skilled Es
oﬀer pure debt securities (C2), low-skilled Es oﬀer pure equity securities (C1) and
where Fs accept to invest.
The speed of convergence towards this separating equilibrium obviously depends
on players’ capacity to implement strategies that reveal Es’ true skills. In other
terms, learning opportunities are not entirely exogeneous and partially depend on
players’ actions. In the multi-period version of the game, there exists a straightfor-
ward strategy for revealing the true skills of Es rapidly. This strategy consists, for
Es, to propose a pure debt security in the first period (C2) and, for Fs, to accept
this oﬀer and to set M = 0. If these strategies are implemented, observing the
project outcomes at the end of the first period perfectly reveals Es’ true skills, with
success associated to a type-H entrepreneur and failure associated to a L-type en-
trepreneur. Afterwards, equilibrium contracting should be similar to the one arising
when players E are perfectly accurate about their skills (see Prediction 3). In sum,
entrepreneurs who are uncertain about their true skills could rapidly learn their
skills by implementing a “learning through risky choice” strategy similar to the one
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described by Köszegi (2006).
Proposition 7 (Speed of convergence and learning through risky choice):
When players are uncertain about Es’ skills, there exists a strategy profile that per-
mits to reveal Es’ true skills at the end of the first period. This profile consists for
Es to propose a pure debt security in the first period (C2) and, for Fs, to accept
this oﬀer and to set M = 0. Such a strategy profile should accelerate convergence
towards the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 3.
Laboratory evidence suggests, however, that players might not converge towards
the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 3 after obtaining experience.
Accordingly, experimental results in the ultimatum game typically show that “pro-
posers” rarely make small oﬀers, and that “responders” often reject small oﬀers
(Cooper et al. 2003, Slonim and Roth 1998). Because a pure debt security (C2)
gives the financier a small fraction of project outcomes in success, these results sug-
gest that, in our framework, pure debt oﬀers might be made rarely, and might be
frequently rejected when made. Explanations provided by reinforcement models of
learning (Roth and Erev 1995) could apply here. In particular, the frequency with
which high-skilled Es oﬀer C2 could diminish over time because of the high rejection
rate of C2 by Fs within first periods. Because of this high rejection rate, Es could
oﬀer less frequently C2 in subsequent rounds even if type-H entrepreneurs might
have learnt their type. In other words, high self-confident entrepreneurs (whether
accurate or not) and high-skilled ones could learn not to oﬀer pure debt securities.5
Proposition 8 (Reinforcement models of learning): Convergence towards
the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 3 does not occur because high
self-confident Es and/or type-H Es learn not to oﬀer pured debt security (C2). The
frequency of an oﬀer C2 should decrease over time and Fs should frequently reject
this oﬀer when made.
5An alternative reason for the non convergence towards the separating equilibrium where type-
H Es oﬀer C2 is that financiers could estimate that the profit sharing associated with this security
is unfair (see for example Rabin 1993).
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3 Experimental design
The experiment is divided in four main treatments and each treatment is divided
into two successive parts: a first part that aims to determine the skills of players E
(either H or L-type) and to elicite skill perceptions; a second part where players E
and F interact conformely to the financing and advising game described above.
The first part starts with a quiz composed of 10 questions dealing with general
culture. After answering the questions, players are asked to evaluate their own
relative performance. More precisely, participants are asked what probability they
assign belonging to the above-median players (their relative performance). At the
end of this first part, a computer program assigns a role (F or E) to each player to
the session. Players E are classified according to their relative performance on the
quiz (in skill rank treatments). A player E is classified as a H-type if he belongs to
the 50% of players E that have the highest number of correct answers on the quiz
and is classified as a L-type if he belongs to the 50% of players E that have the least
correct answers on the quiz. Players are told whether they are F or E, but players
E don’t know whether they are of type H or L. Obviously, each player E has his
own belief (that could be true or false) about his ranking in the group and hence
on his type. Notably, this belief relates to one’s confidence in his relative abilities
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999). In addition to the information concerning their role
(F or E), we communicated to all players additional information on Es’ beliefs at
the group level in two of the five treatments. More precisely, we communicated the
number of high self-confident Es and the number of type-H Es among those who
expressed high self-confidence.
The second part of the experiment starts with a matching protocol where a
computer program randomly matches a player E with a player F. We used a stranger
design, wherein matching changes in the beginning of each period and a player never
deals with the same individual during the experiment. After the matching is made,
the game described in the preceding section begins. Sequentially: (1) Each player
12
E oﬀers a contract Ci (Gi%.200, Pi%.50) to player F; (2) each player F accepts the
oﬀer (and transfers 80 to player E) or rejects the oﬀer (no transfer); (3) if the oﬀer is
accepted, F chooses his advising eﬀort M. Table 2 summarizes the one-period payoﬀ
of each player. Participants were told their own payoﬀ at the end of each period.
Insert Table 2 about here
Our experiment consists of five treatments with four tested parameters (see Table
3).
The first tested parameter is the rule used to rank Es, that is, the way Es are
assigned to the type-H or type-L category. In treatments 1 to 3, Es are ranked
according to their relative performance on the quiz (skill rank condition) and are
classified as type H if they are above-median performers. In contrast, E’s type is set
according to a chance device in treatments 4 and 5 (random rank condition). If ra-
tional, each E should assign a 50% probability for being a type-H in the randon rank
condition. This distinction between skill-rank and random-rank conditions aims to
capture whether inflated self-beliefs aﬀect the equilibrium behavior of entrepreneurs
and financiers. Indeed, we expect Es to be more self-confident and possibly more
overconfident in the skill rank condition (Camerer and Lovallo 1999).
The second tested parameter concerns the additional information given to all
players about self- and overconfidence on a group-level at the end of the first part of
the experiment (after the quiz and before the choice of contracts). In treatment 2,
participants received no additional. In the treatments 1 and 3, players were informed
on the percentage of highly self-confident Es and on the percentage of overconfident
Es. Such an information should aﬀect the securities Ci oﬀered by Es and the subse-
quent decisions of Fs (acceptation and advising eﬀort). More specifically, we expect
that the equilibrium described in Proposition 4 should be more likely when players
receive information indicating that a substantial part of players E are overconfident.
Indeed, in this case, Fs should be more reluctant to accept pure debt securities (C2)
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and highly self-confident Es should rather propose mixed securities. Note also that
players did not receive additional information in random rank treatments (i.e. treat-
ments 4 and 5) as participants should then rationally assign a 0.5 probability for a
given E to be a type-H.
The third parameter tests the eﬀect of the diﬃculty of the task in the skill rank
condition. We used a diﬃcult quiz in treatment 3 and an easy quiz in treatments
1 and 2. By manipulating quiz diﬃculty, we intended to generate variations in Es’
self-confidence and overconfidence. This was motivated by the typical finding that
individuals are more self-confident in their relative performance and are more likely
to be overconfident in easy tasks rather than in diﬃcult tasks (Hoelzl and Rustichini
2005, Moore and Healy 2008).
The last parameter is about the assignment of E’s skills over periods. In the
majority of our treatments, Es kept their type H or L unchanged over the 10 rounds
of each session. In these treatments, learning opportunities existed and Es had the
possibility to learn their true skills over time. This permits to test whether players
converge (or not) towards the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 3, as
discussed in Propositions 6 to 8. In treatment 5, Es potentially changed their type
at each period as a new random aﬀectation of type (type-H or type-L) was made at
each round. This implies that Es had no opportunities to learn their true skills in
treatment 5. All in all, the conditions of treatment 5 are similar to those described
in Proposition 5. Hence, in this treatment, we expected Es and Fs to implement the
strategies described in Proposition 5 at each round.6
The following table summarizes the variation of the tested parameters in the
diﬀerent treatments:
6Importantly, the same individuals participated in treatments 4 and 5. More precisely, each
participant played 20 rounds. During the first 10 periods (treatment 4), players E kept their type
H or L over time. During the 10 subsequent periods (treatment 5), there was a new random
aﬀectation of type H or L to players E in each period. Hence, participants in treatment 5 were
more experienced than those operating in other treatments. For the other treatments, participants
played only 10 rounds.
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Insert Table 3 about here
The experiment was run in May 2010 at laboratory GATE in Lyon. Players were
drawn from a database composed of more than 1600 persons. They were asked to
participate to a computerized game. We used REGATE-NG as software and run four
sessions. A number of 20 players participated to each session, which makes a total
of 80 persons for the whole experiment. In the beginning of each session, players are
aﬀected randomly to each computer. They were asked not to communicate during
all the experiment. Each session was composed of 10 periods and lasted about one
hour, and players were paid in cash and in a private way at the end of the session
according to a rate that converts points into euros according to the rate 1 euro for
each 100 points.
4 Findings
4.1 Skill perceptions
We first analyse how participants evaluate their own performance after the quiz, i.e.
at the end of the first part of the experiment.
As a preamble, we checked that the quiz used in treatment 3 is more diﬃcult
than the one used in the three other treatments. With the easy quiz, the average
percentage of correct answers was 49% in Treatment 1, 54% in Treatment 2, and
53% in Treatment 4. These values show a constant level of diﬃculty of the quiz
for all groups in these “easy” treatments (52% of correct answers in average). In
treatment 3, the average percentage of correct answers was only 33,5% (cf. first line
of Table 4). This confirms that the quiz used in treatment 3 is more diﬃcult and
can be used as a parameter to test the eﬀect of the level of task diﬃculty.
Insert Table 4 about here
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The first measure of skill perceptions is participants’ self-confidence, i.e. their
perceptions of belonging to the above-median players (i.e. of being type H). In our
game a participant is self-confident when he sets a probability higher or equal to 0.5
of belonging to above-median players. Over all treatments, 62.5% of players E are
highly self-confident (believe that they are H), which suggests overconfidence at the
group level. Accordingly, Figure 2 shows that 27.5% of players E are overconfident
(believe they are H although their true type is L) after the quiz vs. 57.5% are
realistic and 15% are underconfident (believe that they are L although they are H).
Considering the eﬀect of quiz diﬃculty on the skill perceptions of players E, Table
4 indicates that players E are more likely to be highly self-confident and overconfident
in easy treatments (Treatments 1, 2 and 4) than in diﬃcult treatments (Treatment
3). This is consistent with findings in psychology which show that people tend to
overestimate their relative performance in easy tasks (Moore and Healy 2008).
Insert Figure 2 about here
4.2 Financiers’ acceptation decision and advising eﬀort
The financier’s decision to invest, i.e. to transfer funds, strongly depends on the
contractual oﬀers made by players E (Table 5). The propension of players F to
invest is strictly increasing in the equity-like orientation of the oﬀered security.
At the two extremes, players F accept an oﬀer C2 (Debt) only 37.4% of the time
and in contrast almost always accept an oﬀer C1 (Equity) (95.7% of the time).
Also, consistent with prediction 2, players F exert more advising eﬀort with equity-
oriented securities than with debt-oriented securities. The average advising eﬀort is
0.51 for contract C1 (Equity) and of only 0.13 for contract C2 (Debt). The advising
eﬀort of financiers is moderate with mixed securities, and as expected, is higher with
contract C4 (Mixed Equity) than with contract C3 (Mixed Debt).
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Insert Table 5 about here
In analyzing the behavior of player F, we face a sample selection bias as the
dependant variable “M” (the intensity of advising eﬀort) is observed only if player
F has accepted the oﬀer made by player E (Figure 3).
Insert Figure 3 about here
For a given F-player i, yi2 is not observed unless yi1 equals one. Therefore, the
robustness of those observations is checked using a bivariate probit model with a
sample selection bias that allows to estimate the probability of two simultaneous
events, the acceptation and the advising decisions (Greene 1997). The results are
given in Table 6.
In a first step, the decision to accept an oﬀer is specified as a latent variable y⇤i1,
denoted:
yi1 =
8><>: 1 if y
⇤
i1 > 0
0 otherwise
It is assumed linear in the observables : y⇤i1 = Xi1 1 + ui1 where Xi1 includes
two set of dummies. On the one hand, we capture our treatment eﬀects through
four dummies namely: treatments 1 to 5, except treatment 2 that is used as our
benchmark. Treatment 5 corresponds to the last 10 periods of treatment 4, where
the type of E (H or L) is distributed randomly after each period. On the other hand,
we set dummies for the contract oﬀers C1, C2 and C4 (C3 is used as a benchmark).
In a second step, the decision to exert an advising eﬀort conditional on the
contract oﬀer being accepted is specified as a latent variable, y⇤i2, denoted:
yi2 =
8><>: 1 if y
⇤
i2 > 0
0 otherwise
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We also assume that the latent variable is linear in the observables : y⇤i2 =
Xi2 2 + ui2 where Xi2 includes three variables, namely overconfidence treated as a
dummy equal to 1 if player E is overconfident and 0 otherwise, and self-confidence
which is set equal to 1 if player E is highly self-confident. The last variable captures
the equity-orientation of the contract, and takes a value of 1 for contract C2 (debt),
2 for C3(Mixed debt), 3 for C4 (Mixed equity) and 4 for C1 (Equity).
Finally, we use the Huber-White variance estimator to allow the fitting of our
model that may contain heteroscedastic residuals because of the likely correlation
between the observations associated to a same individual.
Table 6 reports the results of the two-steps probit regression.
Insert Table 6 about here
Results show that player F’s decision to accept the oﬀer, i.e., to invest, relies
strongly on the type of contract oﬀered by player E: C1 (Equity) and C4 (Mixed
Equity) are more likely to be accepted than C3 (Mixed Debt), whereas C2 (Debt) is
less likely to be accepted than C3. Also, the financier propensity to exert an advising
eﬀort is increasing in the equity orientation of the security oﬀered.
Acceptation decisions also diﬀer according to treatments. For skill treatments
(T1 to T3), players F are less likely to invest when they have feedback on the group
level self-confidence and overconfidence of players E (Treatments 1 and 3 vs. Treat-
ment 2). This could account for the fact that, in the absence of feedback indicating
that players E have biased self-views, financiers suppose that players E are well cal-
ibrated (no self-deception). This is consistent with the “presumption of calibration”
hypothesis advanced by Tenney et al. (2008) and Sah et al. (2013). In contrast,
players F are more reluctant to invest when they receive explicit information that
indicates the presence of miscalibrated Es. It is also noticeable that Fs are more re-
luctant to invest in Treatment 5 where ranking is random and changes every period,
a context in which learning is impossible.
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4.3 Entrepreneurs’ contract oﬀers
Table 7 shows that players E frequently oﬀer mixed securities. Contract C1 (equity),
the first best choice for low-skill Es, is rarely oﬀered even if this contract is almost
always accepted and generates the highest advising eﬀort from player F (see Tables 5
and 6). The debt contract (C2) is more frequently oﬀered than C1 (equity) but is still
less proposed than mixed securities (C3 and C4), particularly in last rounds . Prima
facie, the predominance of mixed securities could be explained by the suspicion
of overconfidence. On the one side, some players E could be reluctant to oﬀer the
contract C1 because they are overconfident and hence believe that the advising eﬀort
of F is unnecessary. Also, the fact that debt (C2) is less often proposed than mixed
securities in last rounds could be due to the reluctance of financiers to accept a
debt contract when they suspect the presence of overconfident entrepreneurs. This
interpretation finds some support in the fact that the contract C2 is often rejected
by financiers (see Tables 5 and 6). Overall, mixed contracts dominate as predicted
by the suspicion of overconfidence.
Our theoretical framework hypothesizes that the type of contracts proposed by
entrepreneurs should depend both on their initial perceived skills (this eﬀect should
be more pronounced during the first rounds) and their actual skills. Table 7 illus-
trates the eﬀect of actual skills and initial perceived skills on the oﬀer of contracts
(only for skill treatments T1, T2 and T3) and also illustrates the dynamics of con-
tract choices by contrasting the first five periods (“first rounds”) and the last five
periods (“last rounds”).
Insert Table 7 about here
Table 7 reveals that the proportion of pure debt oﬀers (C2) is slightly higher
for high- than for low self-confident entrepreneurs (31% vs. 27%). Partial support
for Proposition 2, which predicts that high- and low self-confident should be more
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likely to issue pure debt and pure equity respectively during the first rounds of
the experiment, is also provided by the fact that low self-confident Es proposed
relatively more often pure equity (C1) during the first rounds (17% of the oﬀers
vs. 9% for highly self-confident entrepreneurs). The learning eﬀect, that stipulates
that type-H entrepreneurs should converge towards debt-like securities (C2 and C3)
and type-L ones towards equity-like securities (C1 and C4), finds some support in
the results that 73% of high-skill Es opt for a debt-like security in the last periods
of the experiment (37% choose C2 and 36% choose C3) and that 71% of low-skill
Es opt for an equity-like security (20% choose C1 and 51% choose C4). However,
the convergence occurs mainly through the issuance of mixed securities instead of
pure securities, which departs from the “rational learning” hypothesis formulated in
Proposition 6.
A possible interpretation for the absence of convergence towards “pure” contracts
C1 and C2 across periods can be advanced. The fact that the frequency with which
high-skill entrepreneurs oﬀer C2 (their first-best contract) diminishes across periods
might be explained by the high rejection rate of C2 by financiers during the first
periods. In the subsequent rounds, players E oﬀer less frequently the contract C2
even if H-type entrepreneurs might have learnt their type throughout periods. This
is obviously not consistent with rational learning, since we predicted in Proposition
6 that debt (C2) could be rejected in the first periods (when players F might pre-
sume overconfidence among players E) but should be more frequently accepted once
entrepreneurs know precisely their skills (supposedly in the final periods). All in all,
although entrepreneurs’ skills seem to aﬀects the choice of extreme contracts (C1
and C2), the fact that both skilled and unskilled entrepreneurs converge towards
oﬀers of mixed securities across time suggests that our participants were unable to
interpret the outcomes of the first periods to determine entrepreneurs’ actual skills.
In order to evaluate the robustness of entrepreneurs’ contract oﬀers, we run a
multinomial logistic regression. This allows us to investigate the relation between the
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contract’s choice of players E and independent variables related to their individual
characteristics (self-confidence, overconfidence, the time when their type is revealed)
or structural variables such as rounds. In our game, a player E has to choose one of
the four available contracts, the general form of the multinomial logit model can be
written as:
prob(Y = j | X) = e
X j
1 +
P
eX k
for j=1,2,3,4.
The   are the parameters of the model and X is a vector of player characteristics.
All specifications are normalized with respect to C2. We also consider a variable
quoted reveal_H that accounts for the fact that players E have information that
permits them to infer that they are of type H.7 Once informed, the dummy variable
reveal_H is set to one.
Insert Table 10 about here
Results presented in Table 8 confirm that highly self-confident Es are less likely
to oﬀer pure equity than pure debt. The negative coeﬃcients of the variable “Re-
veal_H” indicate that players E are less likely to oﬀer securities with an equity
component than pure debt when they have enough information to conclude that
they are of type H. Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that Es with
high-skill perceptions prefer to issue pure debt (C2) and provide support to Propo-
sition 2. Although high-skill Es oﬀer preferentially pure debt when they are in
position to know their own skills, the positive coeﬃcients of the variable “round”
show, however, that players E tend to abandon contract C2 over time in favor of
other contracts, which suggests that reinforcement models of learning could apply
here (see Proposition 8). Finally, it is noteworthy that E’s overconfidence has no
7In our game, players E have this information when the following sequence of moves has been
observed: player E has oﬀered contract C2, F has accepted the oﬀer and has set M = 0, player E
received 0.
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eﬀect on the contract oﬀered. This may be due to the dual nature nature of over-
confident Es who are jointly highly self-confident and low-skill. While their high
self-confidence might lead them to oﬀer pure debt during the first rounds, overcon-
fident Es may have incentives to switch towards more equity-oriented securities (in
particular to C4 as suggested in Table 7) once they realize that they are low-skill.
Collectively, the results of our experiment suggest that high initial self-confidence
increases the likelihood of pure debt contract oﬀers during the first rounds. What
happens in the following rounds depends on the reactions of players F to these initial
oﬀers. When these oﬀers are rejected (which occurs frequently according to Table
5), highly self-confident Es cannot revise their self-beliefs and tend to switch towards
mixed securities C3 and C4 in order to increase the likelihood of their oﬀer being
accepted. This is consistent with the idea that highly self-confident entrepreneurs
learn not to oﬀer pure debt securities (Proposition 8). If pure debt oﬀers are accepted
by players F during the first rounds, highly self-confident Es are more likely to learn
their true type. Those who learn that they were realistic, i.e. type-H entrepreneurs,
are more likely to persist in oﬀering C2 (cf. the negative coeﬃcients of Reveal_H in
Table 8). In contrast, those who discover that they were overconfident, i.e. type-L
entrepreneurs, switch towards a more equity-oriented security C4 (see Table 7).
4.4 Diﬀerential payoﬀs across treatments and over
time
A final consideration is about the payoﬀs of participants. Figure 4 suggests that
high-skill Es gain more in T4, the treatment where their skills are initially set by a
random device and are fixed across rounds. This is at first glance surprising because
players E should be more able to evaluate their skills and should perform better in
skill treatments (T1, T2, and T3).
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Insert Figure 4 about here
In order to validate this eﬀect, we run a random eﬀects GSL regression where
the dependent variable is the average per-period payoﬀs of player i (see Table 9).
The regression is run on 80 individuals (N=80) observed during 10 periods. As
illustrated in Table 9, player E earns significantly less than F, mainly because of the
absence of endowment in the first stage of the game. Also, payoﬀs are higher when
player F accepts the contract oﬀered by E and when player E has high skills (H-
type). Another important finding is that treatments have no impact on participants’
payoﬀs, except for type-H entrepreneurs who have significantly higher payoﬀs in
treatment 4 than in other treatments.
Insert Table 9 about here
Notably, the higher payoﬀs of type-H entrepreneurs in the random skill treat-
ment 4, whereby player E is more likely to oﬀer a debt contract C2 and player F is
more likely to accept this oﬀer than in skill treatments (see Table 5), seem consistent
with the “learning through risky choice” strategy described in proposition 7 (Köszegi
2006). In other words, players E may have implemented in this treatment a delib-
erate research strategy, which consists in playing C2 in the first rounds in order to
discover their type. Indeed, in a dynamic setting, playing C2 initially induces little
advising eﬀort from player F and permits to conclude very quickly if player E is H
or L. One might wonder, however, why players did not implement such a profitable
strategy in skill treatments. We leave this discussion for the next section.
5 Discussion and conclusion
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Our objective was to test experimentally optimal contracting and advising when
entrepreneurs are potentially overconfident.
The findings presented in the above section validate several of our theoretical
predictions derived from Vilanova (2013). First, it appears that investors (players
F) are more likely to finance entrepreneurs (players E) and are more likely to provide
advising when they hold equity-oriented securities. Also, highly self-confident en-
trepreneurs - who believe that they are suﬃciently skilled to succeed without external
advice - are more likely to finance through debt-oriented securities, whereas those
with low self-confidence finance preferentially their venture with equity-oriented se-
curities. Consistent with our prediction that entrepreneurs’ biased self-views might
impede signaling, we also found that separation between high-skilled entrepreneurs
and low-skilled ones did not prevail and that at equilibrium a significant fraction
of entrepreneurs issue mixed securities. Interestingly, this experimental results fits
well with the observation that venture capital investors often hold securities that
combine equity and debt features (Kaplan and Strömberg 2003, 2004).
Our experiment also produces some interesting findings about the dynamics of
optimal contracting. Surprisingly, we find very weak evidence of learning over time.
Some reasons might be advanced. Notably, it appears that debt contracts were more
frequently oﬀered by entrepreneurs during the first rounds than in the last rounds of
the experiment. This stands in direct contradiction with the base-line prediction that
high-skill entrepreneurs should learn their true type over time and should converge
towards debt financing in the last rounds of the game. A possible reason why highly-
skill entrepreneurs do not converge towards debt financing is that financiers tend to
largely reject debt oﬀers in the first rounds. While this rejection is natural in the first
rounds (because financiers might suspect overconfidence among entrepreneurs), the
paradox is that oﬀers of debt contracts durably disappeared. In sum, we find that
an equilibrium emerges where pure debt contract are definitively selected out even
if rational learning suggests that experienced and high-skill entrepreneurs should
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converge towards this type of financing. Although not consistent with rational
learning, this finding is concordant with the predictions of reinforcement models of
learning (Cooper et al. 2003, Roth and Erev 1995, Slonim and Roth 1998). All occurs
as if entrepreneurs learn not to oﬀer pure debt, by inferring that early rejections of
debt oﬀers make highly probable that financiers will continue to reject debt in the
future.
The finding that high-skill entrepreneurs obtain higher gains when they are ini-
tially more uncertain about their type (i.e., when their type is set according to a
chance device rather than to their relative performance on the quiz) is also a priori
striking. Notably, our experiment shows that subjects were more likely to implement
a rational “learning through risky choice” strategy (that consists for the entrepreneur
to oﬀer debt, and for the financier to accept the oﬀer and to provide a low advising
eﬀort) and, hence, entrepreneurs were more likely to learn their true type rapidly
when entrepreneurs had less precise self-beliefs at the beginning of the game. A
potential explanation of why this strategy was implemented less often in treatments
where the entrepreneur’s type was set according to his relative performance may
be found in the literature on information avoidance. According to Köszegi (2006),
agents derive ego utility from positive views about the self and don’t want new in-
formation that may taint their positive self-image. In our experimental setting, the
revelation of the entrepreneur’s type is more likely to threaten self-image when type
depends on (relative) skills rather than on a random device. 8Therefore, and consis-
tent with our findings, entrepreneurs, particularly those who are highly confident in
their abilities, should be more reluctant to take the risk of learning their true type
and to implement a “learning through risky choice” strategy in skill rank condition
than in random rank condition. While providing further support to the ego utility
argument of Köszegi (2006) (see also Eil and Rao, 2011), this result also suggests an-
8In the skill rank condition, the revelation that he is a type-L signals to the entrepreneur that
he is an above-median performer in the quiz. In contrast, such revelation only signals “bad luck”
in the random rank condition.
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other channel through which entrepreneurs’ highly confident self-beliefs might hurt
the performance of new ventures. Not only, these beliefs may lead individuals to ne-
glect the quality of their competitors (Camerer and Lovallo 1999), but also they may
prevent them from learning their true abilities through experience. Accordingly, our
findings suggest that initially ignorant entrepreneurs (presumable novice ones) may
implement more eﬀective strategies than experienced ones. In contrast, experienced
entrepreneurs may develop rigid and possibly overconfident self-beliefs over time,
a result consistent with the heuristics and biases research, which argues for an in-
creased risk of overconfidence among experts (Yates et al. 1991). It is important to
note, however, that in our two-players setting the absence of “ego utility” motive is
not suﬃcient to explain the adoption of the “learning through risky choice strategy”
in the random rank condition. To be eﬀective, i.e., to reveal the entrepreneur’s true
type, a debt oﬀer must be followed by a specific sequence of moves by the financier
(acceptation of the oﬀer and low advising eﬀort). The fact that financiers were more
likely to adopt this sequence of moves in random rank treatments may indicate that
financiers anticipate that entrepreneurs are more prone to revise their self-beliefs
and to learn their true type when ego utility is not at stake.
Obviously, this paper is only a first step to explain the dynamics of optimal
contracting between potentially overconfident entrepreneurs and potentially advising
investors. In particular, further work should try to disentangle the extent to which
the dynamics of entrepreneurs’ contract oﬀers reflects the evolution of their self-
beliefs over time and/or their anticipation of investors’ responses.
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Figure 1: Contract oﬀers and players’ one-period contractual payoﬀs
“High CF” is for the case when the project’s final cash flows are 200 and “Low CF”
is for the case when the final cash flows are 50.
Value of M 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
Cost cM 0 5 19 42
Table 1: Intensity and cost of advising activity
Player E
Project’s final cash flow =200 Project’s final cash flow =50
Player F
Transfer 80 to player E Gi%.200  cM ; (1 Gi)%.200 Pi%.50  cM ; (1  Pi)%.50
No Transfer 80 ; 0
Table 2: Players’ one-period payoﬀs
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T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Rank condition for players
E
Skill Skill Skill Random Random
Information about self-
and over- confidence at the
group level
Yes No Yes No No
Diﬃculty of the quiz Easy Easy Diﬃcult Easy Easy
Assignment of E’s skills
throughout periods
Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Random
Table 3: Tested parameters in the diﬀerent treatments
Treatments Easy (T1/T2/T4) Diﬃcult (T3)
% of correct answers 52% 33.5%
% of high self-confident Es 70%*** 40%***
% of overconfident Es 30%* 20%*
Table 4: Eﬀects of treatment diﬃculty on quiz performance and skill perceptions
(***) indicates that the diﬀerence is significant at the 1% level with the Pearson
chi-square
Figure 2: Skill (mis)perceptions of players E across treatments (in %)
“Low” is for low self-confident and “High” is for high self-confident. Full sample
includes all treatments except T5.
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Figure 3: Observed values for yi1 and yi2 in the experiment
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : acceptation by F
Treatment 1 -0.556*** (0,200)
Treatment 3 -0,160 (0,191)
Treatment 4 -0,001 (0,200)
Treatment 5 -0.660*** (0,191)
C1 (Equity) 1.188*** (0,280)
C2 (Debt) -0.726*** (0,167)
C4 (Mixed Equity) 0.721*** (0,160)
Intercept 0.641*** (0,162)
Equation 2 : advising eﬀort (M) provided by F
Equity orientation 0.361*** (0.094)
Intercept 0.176 (0.211)
N 500
Log-likelihood -424.572
 2(.) 130.886
Prob> 2(.) .000
Table 6: Financiers’ reactions (acceptation decision and intensity of advising eﬀort)
to Es’ oﬀers
(***): Significant at the 0.01 level; (**): significant at the 0.05 level; (*) significant
at the 0.1 level.
The dependent variables of equation 1 are dummy variables for treatments with
treatment 2 set as the benchmark and the contract choices with Mixed-debt contract,
C3 as the benchmark. Please, refer to Table 3 for a full description of the four
treatments.
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Figure 4: Average one-period payoﬀ by type of player E and over time
For each type of player and for each treatment, we report the average one-period
period during the first rounds (1 to 5) and the last rounds (6 to 10)
Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Treatment 1 -4.228 (-1.14)
Treatment 3 -1.109 (-0.30)
Treatment 4 -2.203 (-0.54)
Contract accepted by F 30.48*** (11.60)
Player E -60.06*** (-13.80)
Overconfidence 10.06 (1.22)
Self-confidence -7.262 (-1.16)
Player E of type H 29.05*** (4.67)
Player E of type H in treatment 4 14.40** (1.97)
Constant 63.05*** (18.09)
N 800
⇢ 0.0223
 u 5.016
⇢e 33.23
Table 9: The determinants of players’ gains
Treatments 1 to 4 are dummy variables with treatment 2 set as the benchmark (see.
Table 3 for a full description of the treatments).
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C1 (Equity) C3 (Mixed Debt) C4 (Mixed Equity)
Overconfidence 1.019 (0.673) -0.102 (0.405) -0.138 (0.409)
Self-confidence -1.682⇤⇤(0.587) -0.347 (0.329) -0.229 (0.335)
Round 0.261⇤⇤⇤(0.071) 0.232⇤⇤⇤(0.058) 0.342⇤⇤⇤ (0.058)
Reveal_H -0.560⇤⇤(0.186) -0.308 ⇤⇤⇤ (0.060) -0.446 ⇤⇤⇤ (0.072)
Constant -1.277⇤⇤(0.412) -0.607⇤ (0.321) -1.090⇤⇤(0.337)
N 400
Log-likelihood -478.815
 2(.) 106.40
Prob> 2(.) .000
Table 8: Multinomial logistic regression for analyzing contract oﬀers with .
Standard deviations in parentheses. (***): Significant at the 0.01 level; (**): sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level; (*) significant at the 0.1 level.
The debt contract (C2) is the base outcome and dependent variables are dummies for
self confidence and overconfidence. The reveal_H variable is set to one after a sub-
ject learnt his H-type by implementing the “learning through risky choice strategy”,
otherwise it is equal to zero. Round refers to period 1 to 20.
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